Credit Spread Changes in the Euro Area - An Empirical Study of the Relationship Between Interest Rates and Credit Spreads in the Euro-denominated Corporate Bond Market by Johansson, Hampus & Rehnberg, Rickard
		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit Spread Changes in the Euro Area 
An Empirical Study of the Relationship Between Interest Rates and Credit 
Spreads in the Euro-denominated Corporate Bond Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bachelor Thesis in Finance and Economics 
 
University of Gothenburg 
School of Business, Economics and Law 
Spring of 2017 
 
Authors: 
Hampus Johansson, 940917 – 5636 
Rickard Rehnberg 931107 – 5379 
 
Supervisor: 
Jian Hua Zhang 
  
	 2	
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The behaviour of credit spreads is of importance for a wide array of stakeholders. We test the 
relationship between changes in risk-free interest rates and credit spreads in European bond 
market by running OLS regressions using weekly European market data for investment grade 
and non-investment grade bond indices. We collect data from 1999 – 2017 and subsequently 
separate the time series into three periods in an effort to examine differences in different market 
settings. The findings strengthen that of previous research and support an inverse relationship 
between changes in interest rates and credit spreads. Furthermore, we detect the coefficients 
being different in the different periods and attribute part of the change to the growth of 
European bond market. We also find the residuals from our regressions being heavily 
correlated and suspect, as previous researchers, that corporate bond spreads carry a large 
systematic component. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
In the wake of the financial and sovereign debt crises central banks have repeatedly lowered 
interest rates to spur economic activity and inflation. Borrowing costs for corporates have 
moved accordingly but tougher capital requirements on banks has restricted the availability of 
new loans in the traditionally bank reliant European market. As a result, corporate bonds have 
become a more attractive source of debt capital. Especially medium and large-size non-
investment grade firms, that is, firms with a credit rating below BBB, have utilised this market 
thus driving growth in market value. Since early 2009 the euro-denoted market for these non-
investment grade bonds, often referred to as high yield bonds due to the relatively high coupon 
they pay, has grown by almost 700%. 
The credit spread, the difference between the yield of a risky bond and the risk-free equivalent, 
is a central component when pricing and assessing corporate bonds. Credit spreads can have 
different implications depending on the stakeholder in question. For an investor it is the 
premium required in return for taking on the risk that the bond issuer defaults on its debt. They 
can use corporate bonds to gain a higher return instead of buying high yielding long maturity 
government bonds. This implies giving up the interest rate risk of high duration bonds in order 
to gain exposure to default risk of the issuer. Hedge funds use credit spreads when they take 
high levered positions on corporate bonds, using short positions on risk-free bonds to hedge 
against interest rate risks. (Loncarski & Szilagyi, 2012) For the individual firm, it is of course 
a question of its cost of borrowing. Comparing credit spreads to previous terms and its 
competitors’ is useful for negotiations and capital budgeting.  
Policy makers are monitoring the credit market to look for, and manage, sources of instability. 
Since data on bank loans is typically difficult to collect, the bond market is of interest. 
Variations in credit spreads could be used not only as an indicator of potential hazards but also 
to evaluate the effect from changes in monetary policy (Boss & Scheicher, 2002). Since June 
2016 the European Central Bank has also been involved more directly than previously in the 
market for corporate debt as it rolled out its Corporate Sector Purchase Programme, allowing 
them to intervene in the market by buying and selling corporate bonds (European Central Bank, 
2016).  
Consequently, credit spreads have been the subject of a great number of studies. A majority of 
the empirical research has determined a negative relationship between changes in credit spreads 
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and changes in interest rates. Longstaff & Schwartz (1995) constructed a simple two-factor 
model for valuing risky corporate debt. The two factors, interest rate and asset value, 
respectively showed negative correlation to credit spreads. Duffee (1998), criticised the 
creators of the two-factor model for not having taken into account the effect of callability. 
Duffee (1998) subsequently performed a test of his own, whereby he established a weaker yet 
still negative relationship between changes in credit spreads and rates of interest. 
Common for the majority of research on this topic is the focus on investment grade corporate 
bonds. Furthermore, the US market has been the most popular subject for the empirical 
analysis.  
1.2. Purpose and delimitations 
Despite a great deal of research having already been produced on the topic of corporate debt 
and the nature of corporate yield spreads, the subject is still a relevant one for continued 
investigation. Previous research focuses on the North American bond markets and comparing 
different ratings within the investment grade segment. This paper in turn focuses on the 
European market and incorporate a comparison between investment grade and non-investment 
grade bonds. We argue that the European market is especially interesting due to the structural 
changes it has been subject to since its inception in 1999. Especially the increased demand for 
bonds as a source of capital from lower rated firms, but also the negative interest rate 
environment this market has been subject to, makes this line of research relevant. 
 
Research question: 
“How does changes in interest rates affect changes in credit spreads in the European bond 
market?” 
 
In this thesis we shine new light on the traditional view of the behaviour of credit spreads by 
applying old models to European market data. Furthermore, we capture the effect of the 
uniquely low and negative interest rate environment by dividing our data into three time 
periods.  
The outer frame for this study is euro denominated corporate bonds. We have chosen an index 
level approach instead of a bond specific approach. This implies a restriction with regards to 
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our independent variables which, as they cannot be firm-specific, will be on an aggregate level. 
The research includes two rating categories of bonds, investment grade and high yield. Also, 
we limit our investigation to the use of two models. There are many ways to estimate the 
relationship between risk-free rates and credit spreads. However, we have chosen to limit 
ourselves to two regression models. First we run the two-factor model, developed by Longstaff 
& Schwartz (1995). Secondly, with the inspiration of among others Duffee (1998) and Collin-
Dufresne et al. (2001), we add a third factor that accounts for the slope of the euro area yield 
curve.  
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. The next section explains important theoretical 
concepts, the third section contains a more comprehensive literature review of previous 
research and the fourth presents our hypothesis and expected results. Thereafter, in the fifth 
section we present our data and method. The empirical findings are found in the sixth section 
and finally the seventh section concludes the thesis. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Pricing of Bonds 
The shared premise for all bonds is the promise to pay future cash flows to the investor. Some 
bonds pay coupons to investors while other only pay a principal, or face value, amount when 
the bond expires. The price of a bond equals the present value of all its future payments.  ! = !#(%&'ℎ	*+,-') 
As the cash flows from the bonds are being discounted into their present value, the price of the 
bonds will have an inverse relationship with the interest rate. That is, if the interest rate 
increase, the cash flows of the bonds would have to be discounted at a higher rate thereby 
lowering their present value. The sensitivity of a bond’s change in price due to a change in the 
interest rate is measured by duration. The higher a bond’s duration, the more sensitive it is to 
changes in the interest rate. Furthermore, a bond’s duration increases with longer time to 
maturity and lower coupons. (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013) 
2.2. Bonds with Embedded Options 
Compared to conventional bonds, it is a more complex task to determine the yield to maturity 
of a bond with embedded options due to the existence of several possible redemption dates. 
The embedded options are grouped into three main categories: puts, calls and sinking funds. 
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Callable bonds have gain superior popularity over other special redemption types and thus 
regular and callable bonds make the vast majority of all corporate bonds. Therefore, this 
theoretical part will focus more on callable bonds rather than putable or sinking funds.  
An option is a contract between two parties, a buyer and a writer. The buyer has the option, but 
is not obliged, to buy or sell the underlying asset of the option contract at a predetermined price 
in the future. The price which determines if an option is to be exercised is called the exercise 
or strike price. The expiry date is the last day the option can be exercised. The buyer can either 
exercise during a period – so called American style options – or at a certain date which is called 
European style options. Thus, the writer takes on a short position on the contract whereas the 
buyer has a long position. The price of an option contract is referred to as a premium and is 
paid by the byer to the writer. The value of an option is made up of two components, the 
intrinsic value and the time value. The intrinsic value is the difference between the strike price 
and the current market value of the underlying asset. Simply put, it is the value the buyer of an 
option would receive were he or she to exercise the option today, however, it is never less than 
zero. The time value on the other hand is the difference between the premium and the intrinsic 
value. Finally, the profit and loss profile of an option contract differs for the two parties. The 
buyer’s loss is limited to the premium paid to the writer and the profit is theoretically infinite 
and vice versa for the writer. (Choudhry, 2010) 
Now, a callable bond is essentially a bond in which the issuer reserves the right to repay the 
principal, and by extension the remaining coupon payments, before the final date of expiration. 
To that end, a callable bond can be viewed as a portfolio consisting of a conventional bond and 
a call option, where the investor who buys the bond will simultaneously write a call option to 
the bond issuer. However, it is not possible to strip the bond of its option and thusly separate 
the cash flows. It also follows that the value of a callable bond should equal the value of the 
portfolio. (Choudhry, 2010) Therefore, market value of the bond can be formulated as follows:  !/011023	4567 = !/568369:5601	2567 − !/011	5<9:56 
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The provisions regulating the early redemption varies widely. The figure below contains a 
simplified illustration of the impact on the relationship between price and yield. 
 
Normally, when interest rates fall bond prices increase. However, if the bond issuer is able to 
repay the bond prior to its expiry at a set price, the potential pay-off to the bond holder is 
limited. Should interest rates fall dramatically, the issuer of the bond will simply repurchase its 
outstanding debt and refinance itself through a new bond issuance at a lower cost of debt. 
2.3. Credit Risk and Credit Spread 
Corporate bonds carry credit risk, i.e. the risk that the issuer will default and not be able to pay 
all promised payments. Hence, risky instruments demand a higher return than identical risk-
free ones. By discounting the promised future cash flows, the yield of bonds with different risk 
profiles will reflect a difference due to the different risk. This is commonly referred to as the 
credit spread (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013). In other words, the credit spread is the difference 
between yield on a risk-free government bond and the yield on a risky bond with equivalent 
time to maturity. 
2.4. Option-Adjusted Spread 
Traditional risk measures such as Modified Duration and Convexity are inappropriate for 
analysing bonds with embedded call options. The uncertainty in the cash flows needs to be 
FIGURE 1: THE IMPACT OF AN EMBEDDED CALL OPTION ON THE YIELD AND PRICE 
RELATIONSHIP OF A BOND (CHOUDHRY, 2010, S. 273) 
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taken into account and hence, a commonly used method has become the option-adjusted spread 
measure, commonly referred to as OAS. The OAS between two bonds with similar default risk 
would reflect the value of the option only (Choudhry, 2010). However, praxis is to measure 
OAS versus equivalent government bond yields which reflects the value of the option element 
as well as the default risk. This is also what BofA Merrill Lynch provides in their indices which 
therefore constitutes the empirical data for our analysis. The calculations will not be made by 
us as they are provided by BofA Merrill Lynch. However, to give the reader a better 
understanding of the concept we will in the following section describe the procedure as 
explained by Choudry (2010) and BofA Merrill Lynch (2013). 
The OAS versus a risk-free interest rate is calculated against the government yield curve of the 
same currency of denomination. It’s a stochastic model that uses a simulation method, such as 
Monte Carlo, to allow for different scenarios. These scenarios are called interest rate paths 
where, for each path, the value of a cash flow is different, but also less or more likely to occur 
due to the imbedded option (Choudhry, 2010). The average of these discounted values makes 
up the corporate bond’s price. Conceptually, and as the Bond Index Almanac of BofA Merrill 
Lynch (2013, s. 17) puts it, “OAS is the number of basis points that must be added to the one-
month semi-annually compounded forward zero curves in each scenario in order to match the 
average present value of discounted cash flows across all scenarios to the bond's price”. The 
method has become popular among investors as it makes it possible to compare and measure 
bonds with different features to each other. 
3. Literature Review 
3.1. Longstaff and Schwartz 
In an effort to overcome shortcomings of previous research conducted in the field Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995) wrote a paper named A Simple Approach to Valuing Risky Fixed and 
Floating Rate Debt. In the paper they constructed a simple structural model for valuing risky 
corporate debt. Through their research, new ways to look at the valuation of risky corporate 
debt and how to hedge it rose. They believed that some of the most quoted research had some 
shortcomings. To be more specific, Black-Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) keep interest rates 
fixed in their models after which the default risk of a risky security is calculated through option 
pricing theory. This approach assumes that default only occurs when the firm exhausts its 
assets, which according to Longstaff and Schwartz is rather unrealistic. It also tends to lead to 
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smaller anticipated credit spreads than the actual. Other important research such as Black and 
Cox (1976) adjusted to a more flexible default definition and were thereafter able to estimate 
credit spreads closer to actual market observations. However, this approach was also under 
fixed interest rate assumptions and thus something Longstaff and Schwartz wanted to develop. 
So, in their research they incorporated both the default risk and interest rate risk through the 
simplest possible model: ∆> = & + @∆A + BC + D 
Where ∆> is the change in the credit spread, ∆A is the change in the 30-year Treasury bond yield, 
and I is the return for a (depending on industry group) corresponding equity index. 
 
This model showed estimates of credit spreads close to actual spreads. It also showed that the 
credit spreads of firms with a comparable default risk can vary significantly if their assets 
(measured by the corresponding equity index) have different correlations with changes in 
interest rates. This is an explanation for why similarly rated firms and bonds have different 
credit spreads cross industries. 
The main points from Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) was their findings from running their 
model on Moody’s corporate bond yield averages. They found a significant negative 
relationship between changes in credit spreads and interest rates. Since previous research had 
ignored interest rates as a risky variable this was an important finding. 
One important interpretation from the negative relationship is that it makes the duration, and 
thus interest rate risk, of a risky bond lower as an increase in the interest rates is partially offset 
by the decline in the credit spread. This makes the price change for a risky bond smaller than 
for a risk-free bond. Further, the explaining power from the risk-free interest rate is greater than 
from a change in firm value according to their model. This is another strong argument against 
previous models that assumed interest rates to be constant and that firm value determines the 
credit spread. 
3.2. Duffee 
A majority of the bonds issued by US corporates have an imbedded call option, a feature often 
referred to as callability. As such a feature adds a significant amount of uncertainty for the 
investor it cannot be ignored when investigating the pricing and the risk of a bond. Gregory R. 
Duffee (1998) was quick to point out this shortcoming in the research conducted by Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995) who had used indices from Moody’s that included both callable and non-
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callable bonds. Duffee tested whether the spread of a corporate bond’s yield over Treasury 
bond’s yield is dependent on the imbedded call option and was able to confirm this hypothesis. 
Bonds that are callable will behave differently when yields change because a part of the 
variation in the price will be due to the change in the value of the option. The correlations 
between the risk-free interest rate and credit spread were still negative in his regressions but 
Duffee showed that callable bonds are more sensitive to yield changes and that it depends on 
how far in the money the bond is. For out of the money bonds, the yield spreads move similarly 
as with non-callable bonds. On the other end of the spectra, the spread of an in the money 
callable bond shows a far stronger negative correlation with risk-free yields. Also, bonds that 
are call-protected, i.e. have a call option that is not eligible to call for at least another year 
(Duffee’s definition), behave more like callable bonds than non-callable. 
3.3. Continued Research 
In response to the findings of Longstaff and Schwartz a number of researchers has conducted 
studies with various methods and datasets.   
Collin-Dufresne and his partners (2001) elaborated on the two-factor model with several 
variables in order to come closer to the true determinants of credit spreads. They used 
individual non-callable bonds to test for the effect from the changes in firm leverage, slope of 
the government yield curve and implied volatility of S&P 500 in addition to the risk-free 
interest rate and return of S&P 500. The results concluded that interest rates are negatively 
correlated with spreads and that bonds of firms with higher leverage show a stronger correlation 
since they are more exposed to interest rate risks. Most of the other variables showed statistical 
significance and made economic sense in their interpretation. Still, these variables failed to 
explain more than around 0.25 of the variance in the spreads as measured by adjusted R-
squared. Therefore, Collin-Dufresne et al. investigated the residuals from their regressions and 
concluded that a large part of explaining credit spreads is related to a systematic component 
that their variables could not capture. 
Although with higher explanatory power in their regressions, Boss and Scheicher (2002) at the 
Bank for International Settlements wrote a research paper on credit spread determinants in the 
at that time very young euro market. Using different bond indices instead of individual bonds 
they achieved R-squared values of around 0.45 but still found their residuals to be heavily 
correlated with each other and thus also suspect a systematic component that their models failed 
to capture. 
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Loncarski and Szilagyi (2012) who used daily data on US bonds also found a negative 
relationship between interest rates and corporate bond spreads but argue that the relative 
illiquidity in the bond market could cause delays in the effects. Other researchers have argued 
that credit spreads are event driven but also for a positive long run relationship between interest 
rates and credit spreads using a co-integrated approach as well as a lagged short-term interest 
rate (Morris, Neal, & Rolph, 1998; Lin & Curtillet, 2007). 
4. Hypothesis 
4.1. Hypothesis and Expected Results 
We will run two regressions using the credit spreads of investment grade and non-investment 
grade bonds as dependent variables. The first model uses the risk-free rate and the return of a 
stock index as estimators of the dependent variable whereas the second model also includes a 
slope variable. Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), Duffee (1998) and others suggest a negative 
relationship between credit spreads and interest rate. Thus, we formalise our hypothesis as 
follows: 
H0 = The relationship between the risk-free interest rate and credit spreads is positive 
or equal to zero. 
H1 = The relationship between the risk-free interest rate and credit spreads is negative. 
We form our expected results according to the findings of previous research. Longstaff & 
Schwartz (1995), Duffee (1998), Collin-Dufresne (2001), Boss & Scheicher (2002), Lin & 
Curtillet (2007) predict that changes in risk-free rate will have an inverse effect on changes  in 
credit spreads. Furthermore, Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), Collin-Dufresne (2001), Boss & 
Scheicher (2002) and Lin & Curtillet (2007) finds a negative relation between equity index 
returns and changes in credit spreads. Lastly, Duffee (1998), Collin-Dufresne (2001), Boss & 
Scheicher (2002), Lin & Curtillet (2007) also find changes in the slope of the yield curve to be 
negatively related to changes in credit spreads. 
Thus, in table one we register our expected signs of our three independent variables. In short, 
we believe our findings will show a significant negative relationship between risk-free interest 
rates and corporate bond spreads.  
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TABLE 1: EXPECTED SIGNS FOR THE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS. 
Coefficient Expected sign 
Risk-free interest rate - 
Return on risky assets - 
Slope - 
 
Further, we expect the estimators to change as the market matures in later periods of the time 
series. Likewise, we expect to the predictive power of our models to grow as the market 
matures. Compared to the first period, variables omitted from our model, i.e. liquidity risk, will 
probably not affect credit spreads as much in the larger and more developed market in the third 
period. However, the low interest rate environment might have an off-setting effect. 
Nevertheless, we expect a greater deal of variation to be explained by our model in later periods 
compared to earlier samples and the sample as a whole. Also, it is reasonable to expect that 
accuracy of our estimators and the predictive power of our regression models to be smaller in 
the volatile period around the financial crisis 2008. 	
5. Method 
5.1. Data 
The sample for our research consists of weekly data collected from the date of the launch of 
the Economic and Monetary Union, EMU, 1 January 1999, (The European Commission, 2017), 
up until the 31th of March 2017. This gives us 951 observations with no missing values. We 
divide the data into three sub-sets with the first stretching from 1999 to the end of 2006, the 
second from 2007 to the end of 2012 and the last from 2013 to the last week of March 2017 
and we will hereafter refer to them as the first, the second and the third. The different subsets 
contain 416, 313 and 222 observations respectively and are supposed to reflect different market 
settings. Figure 3 below illustrates how the OAS of both the investment grade (bonds with a 
rating between AAA and BBB) and high yield (bonds with a rating below BBB) indices have 
fluctuated during the whole sample period. As can be seen, our interceptions occur between 
the periods with more volatility. Breaking up the data in this manner our first period includes 
the inception of the euro and the burst of the IT bubble. The second period includes the financial 
crisis and to a large extent also the sovereign debt crisis. The third period contains the era of 
low inflation and low interest rates. Since interest rates have fallen into negative territory this 
is also the period we are interest in the most. All of the data is collected through the Bloomberg 
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Terminal. Each variable is described in more detail in the following sub-sections, starting with 
the dependent variable in our regression. 
FIGURE 2:	OAS FROM 1999 TO 2017. 
Investment Grade is plotted in blue on the left axis and High Yield in red on the right.  
 
5.2. Dependent Variables 
To approximate the performance of the investment grade bonds in the European bond market 
we will use the BofA Merrill Lynch Euro Corporate Index with ticker name ER00. The index 
tracks the performance of euro-denominated investment grade (based on the ratings of S&P, 
Moody’s and Fitch) corporate debt which is publicly issued in the Eurobond markets or 
domestic markets of Euro member states. The non-investment grade equivalent will be 
approximated using BofA Merrill Lynch Euro High Yield Index, ticker HE00. The index tracks 
the performance of euro-denominated below investment grade corporate debt which is publicly 
issued in the Eurobond markets or domestic markets of Euro member states. 
In order to estimate the CS, we will use the yield to maturity of the two indices and calculate 
the difference to another BofA Merrill Lynch index named EG13. EG13 consists of AAA rated 
euro-denominated government bonds with a maturity of five to seven years. This is close to the 
average maturities of the corporate bond indices that have been fluctuating between five to six 
years during the period of our study. Hence, credit spreads for both of the corporate bond 
indices are calculated as in the following equation: %>E = AFGE − AFGHIJK 
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In accordance with Duffee (1998), using indices consisting of a combination of callable and 
non-callable bonds does not allow for accurate conclusion to be drawn with regards to 
variations in conventional yield spreads. To avoid this issue, previous research has commonly 
used indices which are exclusively comprised of non-callable corporate bonds. However, the 
smorgasbord of European corporate bonds is not as diverse as the American. As a consequence, 
the indices we use to approximate the yield on European corporate bonds include callable as 
well as non-callable securities. The proportion of callable bonds also changes over time for the 
two indices. With regards to the High Yield index, the fraction of callable bonds is falling over 
the time period. This would, according to Duffee (1998) bring about a weaker negative relation 
between the credit spread and the risk-free rate. For the investment grade index, the proportions 
are quite different. For the majority of the time period, callable bonds make up a negligible part 
of the index. In recent years, however, the proportion of callable bonds has grown significantly. 
To account for the effect of callability on the relationship of the risk free rate and CS, we will 
use the OAS figures. 
FIGURE 3: THE PROPORTION OF CALLABLE BONDS WITHIN BOFA’S INDICES. 	
	
For our regressions we construct the weekly changes, in terms of absolute values, in the 
respective spread measure for the respective index as the first difference where the lowered x 
denotes either investment grade or high yield: ∆CSN = CSN,P − 	CSN,PQJ ∆OASN = OASN,P − 	OASN,PQJ 
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5.3. Independent Variables 
Risk-free Interest Rate 
Our first independent variable is, just as in the structural model by Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995), the risk-free interest rate. The risk-free rate in the EMU, as set by ECB, only ranges up 
to one year. Thus, in order to capture the effect of a longer term risk-free rate on the CS and 
OAS, we have chosen a ten-year generic government bond index named GECU10YR as a 
proxy for the risk-free interest rate. In the original two-factor model by Longstaff and Schwartz, 
30-year Treasury bonds represents the risk-free interest rate component. In more recent 
research papers however, arguments have been made that using government bonds with shorter 
maturities is more appropriate. Government bonds with a maturity of ten, five or two years are 
more closely related to the maturities of corporate bonds and reflect changes in monetary policy 
more precisely (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, 2001; Boss & Scheicher, 2002; 
Loncarski & Szilagyi, 2012; Batten, Jacoby, & Liao, 2014). 
The GECU10YR index consists of generic government bonds with a maturity of 10 years 
issued, mainly, by the governments of Germany and France (Bloomberg, 2017). The weekly 
change is calculated in the same manner as the weekly changes in CS’s and OAS’s above. ∆TU'VWTXX = YZ%[10A^9 − YZ%[10A^	9QJ 
The intuition behind the negative relationship between risk-free interest rates and the credit 
spreads relies on the models of valuating risky debt by Black and Scholes (1973), Merton 
(1974) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). In structural models risky debt in a company can 
be seen as a put option of the firm value, thus an increase in the risk-free interest rate will 
discount the value of the option more and hence its value decreases. Also, in the original setup 
by Merton where the interest rate is equal to the drift of the risk-neutral process, a higher 
interest rate means a higher expected value increase of the firm. Together these two effects 
imply a lower cost of insurance against default, which is the value of the put option, with the 
consequence of narrowing credit spreads.  (Merton, 1974; Boss & Scheicher, 2002) 
Asset Value Factor  
The second component in the two-factor model is the return on risky assets for which Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995) uses the return of a stock market index as a proxy. Therefore, we will 
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approximate the performance of the European stock market using a subset of the Euro Stoxx 
600, ticker code SXXE. Stocks from all of the European Union are eligible for the full Euro 
Stoxx 600 index while only euro-denominated stocks qualify for the subset we use. It consists 
of a broad variety of stocks listed on small, mid and large cap lists in eleven Eurozone countries 
weighted by free floating market cap and is quoted as a price index (STOXX Ltd, 2017).  The 
return of the index, in time period t, is calculated as follows: 
RP`aaH = SXXEP − SXXEPQJSXXEPQJ  
Unfortunately, the quotations of the SXXE is not perfectly aligned with the corporate bond and 
risk free rate indices. On 22 occasions, out of the 951 weeks in this sample, the performance 
of the equity index is not quoted on the same date as that of the bond indices. To approximate 
return for each of the 22 occasions, we will use the quoted performance on the stock index 
reported one day after the bond indices. We feel this is a reasonable approximation given that 
the time difference of the two indices are no more than one day. Furthermore, the 22 occasions 
are spread quite evenly over the time period we have chosen. 
There are two main arguments for how and why the stock market returns should affect credit 
spreads. First, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) state simply that the default risk of a firm 
increases when the value of its assets decrease. Hence, the relationship is negative and positive 
stock market returns implies more narrow credit spreads.  Boss and Scheicher (2002) 
extrapolates on this argument. The default risk of a firm is to a large extent dependent on its 
leverage ratio which can be measured as the debt-to-equity, debt-to-assets or debt to another 
measure of firm value. Since both their research, as well as ours, is based on indices rather than 
firm specific data a more specific leverage ratio variable is not available. Using the stock 
market return as a proxy for firm value implies that for a fixed level of debt the leverage 
increase with a decrease in returns and hence default risk increase. 
The second argument for the negative relationship build on the assumption that stock market 
returns can be seen as a proxy for the general condition of the economy. Even if default rates 
stay constant, expectations are that the recovery rate is higher in times of economic expansion 
than in times of contraction (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, 2001). Thus, credit spreads 
should narrow when the stock market generates high returns.  
Term Structure 
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The term structure of the European risk-free rate contains information about market 
expectations for interest rates and is generally an important point of reference when assessing 
monetary policy conditions. In line with previous research, we too are interested in the 
information captured by the term structure of the risk-free interest rate. Duffee (1998) took 
inspiration from, among others, Litterman & Scheinkman (1991) who showed that a majority 
of the variance in US Treasury term structure can be conveyed by changes in its “level” and 
“slope”. Duffee consequently decomposed the term structure variable in his research. He used 
the three-month Treasury bill as a proxy for the level and the spread of the 30-year Treasury 
yield over the three-month Treasury bill to approximate the slope of the term structure. 
To illustrate the meaning of the two components let us examine the euro area yield curve as of 
the 31st of March 2017. The yield curve is displayed in figure 5 below.  
FIGURE 4: THE EURO AREA YIELD CURVE. 
The euro area yield curve as of 31/3/2017. The yield curve shows separately AAA-rated euro area 
central government bonds and all euro area central government bonds (including AAA-rated). 
(European Central Bank, 2017) 
	
	
First, the yield curve may shift upwards or downwards. The location of the curve, as determined 
by where it is generally allocated along the y-axis, is referred to as the level of the yield curve. 
In our model 2, we will again use the GECU10YR index as a proxy for the level of the term 
structure and construct the following regression variable: ∆TU'VWTXX = YZ%[10A^9 − YZ%[10A^9QJ 
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In contrast to Duffee (1998), we use a ten-year index, rather than a three-month rate, to measure 
the level of the yield curve. Duffee mentions that choosing a maturity for the level coefficient 
is very much an arbitrary task as it can be measured anywhere along the yield curve. Therefore, 
we echo the argument from a previous section stating that the ten-year interest rate is more 
closely related to the corporate bond indices we use.  
Second, the yield curve might rotate thereby making the slope of the curve steeper or flatter. 
The rotation of the curve has different meaning depending not only on the direction of the 
rotation, but also where along the curve the rotation axis is located. Following the reasoning of 
Duffe (1998) and others (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, 2001; Boss & Scheicher, 2002; 
Batten, Jacoby, & Liao, 2014) we construct our Slope-coefficient by subtracting the yield of a 
risk-free index with shorter term to maturity from the GECU10YR index.  SlopeJ = GECU10YR − EURIBORKm Slopen = GECU10YR − EURIBORJnm	SlopeK = GECU10YR − GECU2YR	∆Slopep = Slopep,P − Slopep,PQJ 
We will construct our slope coefficients using three different short term interest rates: The three 
and twelve-month Euro Interbank Offer Rate, EURIBOR, and the GECU2YR. The EURIBOR 
is one of the most important reference rates in the European monetary system. It commonly 
serves as the foundation for the pricing of a great variety of financial products and services. It 
is determined by the average interest rate at which the 20 most important banks to the monetary 
union, the so called “panel banks”, can borrow money from each other (European Money 
Markets Institute , 2017). The GECU2YR is the equivalent to GECU10YR but consists of 
government bonds with a maturity of two years rather than ten. (Bloomberg, 2017) 
One drawback of measuring the slope and the level of the yield curve with the use of the same 
index, GECU10YR, is that it will not allow for a direct comparison with the findings of Duffee 
(1998). While the interpretation of changes in slope-estimates is the same in our thesis as in 
Duffee’s research, they are measured in different ends of the yield curve. For Duffee, holding 
level unchanged and increasing the slope of the yield curve would in real terms translate to an 
increase in interest rates with longer maturity than the three-month T-bill. Conversely, in our 
regression outputs, the slope is determined by changes in the short term interest rate.  
5.4. Method of Analysis 
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To analyse our data, we are running OLS-regressions with time series data in the statistical 
software Stata. This method is what most of the previous authors on the topic have used and 
also something we are familiar with. Therefore, we are confident for the results of our research 
to be valid. 
We will commence our analysis by applying the two-factor model, i.e. model 1, as developed 
by Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), to our set of data. Despite it having been subject to criticisms, 
we incorporate the two-factor model to estimate how the traditional view of the relationship 
between credit spreads and risk free rates of interest complies to the last 18 years. The model 
regresses the change in credit spread on two independent variables: the change in risk free rate 
and the return on risky assets.  
For the dependent variable, we use the two different types of spreads. In the first version of 
model 1 we run the regression with the weekly change in CS. In the second version we use the 
weekly change in option adjusted spread, OAS, as the dependent variable to take into account 
the imbedded options.  
Model 1 a) ∆%> = 	qr + qJ∆TU'VWTXX + qn^`aaH + # 
b) ∆st> = 	qr + qJ∆TU'VWTXX + qn^`aaH + # 
Where ∆riskfree is the change in the GECU10YR index and RSXXE is the return of the equity index.  
We then expand the two-factor model by adding a third coefficient.  
Model 2 	∆st> = 	ur + uJ∆TU'VWTXX + un^`aaH + uK∆>+,vX6 +w	
Where ∆riskfree is the change in the GECU10YR index, RSXXE is the return of the equity index and 
∆Slope is the change in slope of the Euro area yield curve.  
Incorporating the Slope variable enables us to have a more detailed look into the relationship 
between the credit spread and the interest rates. We subsequently run the regression using the 
change in OAS spread for the period 1999 – 2017. 
Thereafter, we will run the models on the different subsets of data that are divided as described 
into three periods. In so doing, we can compare the magnitude of the coefficients. As 
mentioned, of particular interest is of course the last period where risk-free rates have moved 
into negative territory. 
5.5. Statistical Properties  
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Since our sample consists of time series data there are a number of properties that need to be 
checked. First, highly persistent variables. There are two common methods to overcome highly 
persistent variables. One is to use the first difference. This is what we do for all of our variables 
except for SXXE, where we use the return. How we have calculated the return of SXXE is 
approximately equal to logging the variable, which is the other common method for 
overcoming highly persistent variables. Subsequently, the different spreads correlates with 
themselves around a level of 0.2 to 0.3 and the EURIBOR3M has by far the strongest 
autocorrelation with a value of 0.49. This variable is, however, not a part of the main focus of 
regressions and interpretations and since none of the variables are near 0.9 we should not have 
a problem with highly persistent variables in our dataset. 
Second, we check for seasonality. Table 12 in the appendix contains the P-values for 
regressions of every variable, separately, on quarterly dummies. We are unable to reject	xr =yJ = yn = yK = 0, where y6 is the effect from z6 on the 5% significance level. Consequently, 
our data should not suffer from seasonality bias. 
Finally, the risk of having heteroscedasticity in the error term is also needed to be dealt with. 
We simply use the Robust command in Stata for all our regressions which makes the standard 
errors larger and thus, less likely to reject a null hypothesis that a coefficient is equal to zero. 
6. Empirical findings 
6.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 below contains descriptive statistics for the whole sample period whereas the different 
subsets are available in the appendix. 
The 951 observations in our dataset are distributed fairly normally with mean values close to 
zero. As an example of the distribution of the variables figure 6 shows the weekly changes in 
OAS for both of the corporate bond indices. Even though the level of the spreads has been 
fluctuating the weekly changes are evenly distributed around zero. The few large outliers are 
mainly related to the financial crisis in 2007-2008 and thus, the sub-sample stretching over that 
period has higher standard deviations as well as minimum and maximum values further from 
zero for all variables compared to the other two sub-samples. Regarding credit spreads one 
should also note that for all periods, the standard deviation of the high yield index is 
substantially higher than for the investment grade index. The high yield index volatility 
decreases from the first to the third period, which is in line with expectations. As the market 
	 23	
grows, gains more interest and becomes more efficient it should be behaving more and more 
like corporate bonds in more established segments with higher ratings. 
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, 1999-2017. 
 
The interest rates show common characteristics however, the two year and the ten year have 
higher standard deviations. The three different slope variables also seem to behave pretty 
similarly when looking at the descriptive statistics. This is also what one could expect given 
their construction since they all share one factor (the GECU10YR) and the different short term 
interest rates are highly correlated. 
Variable	 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DCSIG 951 0.001% 0.059% -0.290% 0.490% 
DOASIG 951 0.001% 0.056% -0.240% 0.610% 
DCSHY 951 -0.003% 0.445% -4.050% 4.540% 
DOASHY 951 0.004% 0.403% -3.490% 4.170% 
DEURIBOR3M	 951 -0.004% 0.052% -0.470% 0.321% 
DEURIBOR12M	 951 -0.003% 0.060% -0.296% 0.321% 
DGECU2YR	 951 -0.004% 0.099% -0.421% 0.423% 
DGECU10YR 951 -0.004% 0.100% -0.356% 0.356% 
RSXXE 951 0.059% 2.888% -21.761% 13.369% 
DSlope1	 951 0.000% 0.101% -0.437% 0.586% 
DSlope2	 951 0.000% 0.096% -0.323% 0.543% 
DSlope3	 951 0.000% 0.079% -0.322% 0.356% 
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FIGURE 5: THE WEEKLY CHANGES IN HIGH YIELD AND INVESTMENT GRADE OAS 1999-
2017. 
 
6.2. Model 1 
We commence by running the two-factor model, developed by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). 
The results from these regressions, shown in table 3, fail to surprise us. Both of the indices 
show a significant and negative relationship between the credit spread and the risk free interest 
rate. Furthermore, in accordance with the findings of Longstaff and Schwartz, our regression 
output also shows that the relationship increases for bonds with inferior rating. 
Using the Option-Adjusted Spread provided by BofA Merrill Lynch, the coefficients change 
somewhat. According to the findings of Duffee (1998), the explanatory power of the risk-free 
interest rate is smaller for non-callable bonds. It is therefore little surprising that in the 
regressions where callability is taken into account, using the OAS, the risk-free coefficient is 
smaller than its CS equivalent. Apart from the change in the risk-free variable, the results are 
widely similar between the two sets of regression models.  
With regards to the second coefficient, α2, approximating the relation between credit spreads 
and changes in return on risky assets, there are no major deviations from the findings of 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). More precisely, there is a significant negative relationship 
which increases for companies with lower credit ratings. We cannot observe any major changes 
in this variable when altering the dependent variable to account for callability. Intuitively, 
changing the dependent variable should not affect its relation to risky asset returns as much as 
the risk-free rate of interest. While lower interest rates will directly impact the value of the 
embedded call option, the risky asset returns will only have an indirect effect.  
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Furthermore, given the proportion of callable bonds in the corporate bond indices we use, the 
risk-free coefficients are probably less likely to be consistent over time. Accordingly, they will 
likely cloud the true relation between credit spread and the variables we are interested in 
observing. Consequently, in pursuit of finding an accurate relationship between the risk free 
rate and the credit spread, moving forward, we will use OAS as dependent variable in our 
regressions. 
TABLE 3: RESULTS FROM MODEL 1, 1999-2017. 
In this table the results from running the Longstaff and Schwartz model are presented. Two different 
dependent variables are used. ∆CS is the credit spread calculated as the difference between the YTM 
of the corporate bond index and an index of AAA rated government bond with a similar maturity. ∆OAS 
is the option adjusted spread over the government yield curve. ∆riskfree is the weekly change in 
GECU10Y and ^`aaH  is the weekly return in the SXXE index. T statistics are given in the parentheses. 
Model 1 a) ∆%> = 	qr + qJ∆TU'VWTXX + qn^>||Z + # 
Model 1 b) ∆st> = 	qr + qJ∆TU'VWTXX + qn^>||Z + # 
 Investment grade High Yield 	 Model 1a  Model 1b Model 1a Model 1b 
Intercept 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.17) (0.52) (-0.16) (-0.21) 
∆riskfree -0.220 -0.102 -0.747 -0.608 
 (-10.42)C (-4.42) C (3.80) C (-3.51) C 
RSXXE -0.004 -0.007 -0.064 -0.064 
 (5.30) C (-6.73) C (5.30) C (-6.00) C 
R2 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.28 
Prop > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
A p<0.10; B p<0.05; C p<0.01 
 
6.3. Model 2 
Investment grade 
Incorporating an estimator for the slope of the yield curve changes the coefficient value of the 
∆riskfree variable in the investment grade index. For model 2a and 2b, the effect of changes in 
our risk-free rate index seems to just about disappear. This is most likely explained by the lack 
of correlation between the credit spread and three and twelve month EURIBOR. Slope1 and 
Slope2 therefore behave much like the 10-year risk-free interest rate index which is confirmed 
in table 13 in the appendix where we can observe a correlation of 0.87 and 0.81 for the two 
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Slope coefficients with the 10-year risk-free interest rate. The models are likely suffering from 
a multicollinearity problem which would damage the accuracy of our predictors.  
In model 2c, however, the value of the ∆riskfree coefficient is more extreme than its two-factor 
model equivalent. Simultaneously the value of the Slope-coefficient has, quite unexpectedly, 
returned a positive value. Furthermore, as the GECU2YR index used in calculating our third 
slope has a higher correlation to the credit spread, correlation between Slope3 and the risk-free 
rate coefficient is down to 0.41. In addition, the variable is significant at the one percent level. 
What is more, we should note that the coefficient for return of the equity index experience 
almost no change at all across the regression outputs in model 2. This is largely a manifestation 
of the same effect we find when altering the dependent variable from CS to OAS. Risk-free 
interest rate and the slope of the yield curve are directly related whereas stock market return 
has a weaker relationship with the term structure.  
Overall, adding the slope coefficient leaves us with about the same explanatory power, as 
measured by R-squared, as the two-factor model. This would suggest that model 2 is rather 
pointless as a tool for determining changes in credit spreads, at least among investment graded 
bonds in European bond market. 
High Yield  
If we alter the dependent variable to the high yield index OAS and rerun the regression, we 
produce the results in the right half of table 4. Similar to the results of the investment grade 
regressions we are probably seeing the effect of multicollinearity in the regressions using 
Slope1 and Slope2. Besides Slope1 and Slope2 turn out insignificant. For model 2c, however, 
the regression output suggests a quite strong and positive relationship between credit spreads 
and slope with a significance level of five percent.  
In contrast to the investment grade regression outputs, the risk-free coefficient values are more 
negative for the high yield index in all versions of model 2. Stock returns are reflecting the 
same pattern in the high yield regression as in its investment grade equivalent. That is, the 
return of the stock market does not change by the addition of the level of the yield curve. 
Lastly, with regards to the coefficient of determination, model 2a and b are rendered less 
useless compared to the two-factor model. 2c however, manages to produce a slightly higher 
R-squared. 
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TABLE 4: RESULTS FROM MODEL 2, 1999-2017. 
This table presents the regression outputs for our extended model. The table includes the regression 
outputs from model 1b) as a point of reference. The dependent variable is the ∆OAS spread for the 
investment grade and high yield indices. We use three different versions of Slope. Times series data 
collected for the period 1999-2017. ∆riskfree is the change in level of the euro yield curve, RSXXE is the 
return of the SXXE index, and Slope is the slope of the euro yield curve. 
Model 2 a-c)	∆st> = 	ur + uJ∆TU'VWTXX + un^>||Z + uK∆>+,vX6 + w 
 
 Investment grade High yield 
 Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
Intercept 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.52) (0.75) (0.70) (0.31) (-0.21) (-0.27) (-0.29) (-0.31) 
∆riskfree -0.102 -0.002 -0.018 -0.131 -0.608 -0.757 -0.849 -0.818 
 (-4.42)C (-0.04)  (-0.52)  (-6.07)C (-3.51) C (-1.68)A (-2.62)C (-5.17)C 
RSXXE -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 -0.061 
 (-6.73)C (-6.72)C (-6.71)C (-6.85)C (-6.00)C (-6.00)C (-6.02)C (-6.20)C 
∆Slope1  -0.108     0.161   
  (-2.38)B     (0.34)   
∆Slope2   -0.106     0.305  
   (-2.93)C     (0.79)   
∆Slope3    0.079     0.560 
    (2.81)C     (1.98)B 
R2 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
A p<0.10; B p<0.05; C p<0.01 
 
6.4. Examining Differences in the Data Set 
In order to observe the value and significance of each estimator in different episodes, we have 
divided the data into three periods. Also, because of the likelihood of collinearity issues, we 
exclude Slope1 and Slope2 from these regressions. The results are shown in table 5. Similar to 
our expectations, there are noticeable differences between the periods.  
First, the explanatory power of both models is substantially lower in the first period compared 
to the latter. There are a few interpretations for this phenomenon. One could be the fact that 
the market value has increased dramatically over our time period. In consonance with our 
expectations, the two-factor model, and its expanded version, should produce more accurate 
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results in a larger and more efficient market. Innately, variables which are omitted from our 
regression models, e.g. liquidity risk, will have less of an effect on changes in credit spreads in 
the third period. Another explanation is the fact that the correlation between stock return and 
credit spreads grows stronger throughout the time period. In the second period, the stock return 
naturally is a very important factor as the time frame houses a very volatile period for stock 
returns.  
Second, the risk-free rate is not a significant component for the two-factor model in the second 
period. This is not very surprising as it captures two major economic events; the global 
financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. The two events brought about high levels of 
financial distress which accordingly disturbs the results of the two-factor model. Upon 
expanding the model, however, the ∆riskfree coefficient becomes significant when using the 
investment grade index as dependent variable. To our surprise the regression returns a positive 
value for the slope coefficient. For the high yield index, however, expanding the model only 
generates an interest rate component which is significant at a 10 percent level in the second 
period. This suggests that companies with lower credit ratings were subject to greater financial 
distress during the two crises of the second time period. Their credit spreads should therefore 
be expected to vary much more like the stock index than the relatively stable risk free interest 
rates.  
Third, the ∆riskfree coefficient do vary between the different time periods but the interpretation 
of the change is not an easy one to call. Looking at the two-factor model, that is model 1b, and 
using the investment grade index as independent variable, the coefficient decreases a bit in the 
third period compared to the first. In contrast, for high yield, the coefficient dramatically 
increases in value. The latter is in line with what we expect but both of the changes can be 
explained with changes in volatility. For OASIG volatility experience a minor increase whereas 
the volatility for OASHY in period three is less than half the volatility in period one. With 
regards to the regression outputs of model 2c, we exhibit the same issues as when performing 
the regression on the entire time period. More concretely, we fail to find a realistic slope 
coefficient as it produces a positive value in each time period.  
Finally, the last row of table 5 shows us the probability of rejecting a null hypothesis that all 
independent variables are equal to zero. We reject this null hypothesis for both models in all 
three time periods. 
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6.5. Compliance with Previous Research  
To begin with, the negative relation between the risk-free rate variable, ∆riskfree, and the credit 
spread exhibit a similar pattern in table 4 as in table 5. The relation holds in the two-factor 
model and in its expanded version and is negative for both investment grade and grows more 
extreme in the high yield regressions. With the exception of the insignificant coefficient in the 
second period, the relationship is also in line with the findings of Longstaff & Schwartz (1995), 
Duffe (1998), Collin-Dufrense et al. (2001), Boss and Scheicher (2002) and Lin and Curtillet 
(2007). 
Quite surprisingly, however, is the fact that the slope coefficient in model 2c remains positive 
throughout the time periods in which we run our regressions. These findings are inconsistent 
with our expectations and the findings of Duffee (1998), Collins-Dufresne et al, (2001) and 
Boss and Scheicher (2002) who find a negative relationship. There is little to suggest that the 
positive coefficient make economic sense. A steeper curve should reflect a more optimistic 
economic outlook with improved funding and liquidity conditions for corporations. In such a 
scenario the credit spreads should intuitively narrow. Conversely, a flatter curve should 
indicate a dry up of sources of funds in the capital markets and an overall more bearish 
economic outlook which implies widened credit spreads. This intuition is, however, not 
confirmed by the findings in our regression models. 
Simultaneously, in model 2c, the negative relationship between the level of the yield curve, 
∆riskfree, and credit spread grows stronger when expanding the two-factor model with the 
slope variable. This pattern is true for all regression outputs in table 5. The reason for this 
occurrence probably lies in the construction of the level and slope variables. The risk-free rates 
used to construct Slope3, which are ∆GECU10YR and ∆GECU2YR, correlate strongly with 
each other. Furthermore, both variables have a correlation with the ∆OAS, for both rating 
classes, of around -0.3. Moreover, when we create Slope3 by subtracting the short term interest 
rate from the long term [∆GECU10YR - ∆GECU2YR = ∆Slope3] we are left with a coefficient 
which shows a very low and positive correlation with the dependent variable. We therefore 
suspect that the properties of the two-year and ten-year risk-free interest rate indices are such 
that they allow the Slope3 variable to be ripped of its negative relationship with credit spreads.  
Boss and Scheicher (2002) constructed a slope variable using ten and two-year interest rates 
which they subsequently used in their regression model. Their slope coefficient, in contrast, 
show a reasonable negative correlation with the independent variable. However, not only do 
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Boss and Scheicher use indices with longer maturity corporate bonds, they also collect data 
from 1998-2001. Therefore, it is likely that their slope coefficient behaves differently in 
relation to credit spreads compared to our estimator. Notwithstanding that when we apply 
model 2c to our first period, which most resembles the period which Boss and Scheicher 
examines, the slope coefficient is rendered insignificant. One should also note that Boss and 
Scheicher did not present the correlation between their two-year interest rate that they 
subtracted from the ten year when constructing their slope variable. This restrains us from 
creating a slope variable that resembles that of Boss and Scheicher.  
Despite the slope coefficient being difficult to interpret the ∆riskfree and RSXXE coefficients 
are of economic importance. The explanatory power of our models for spreads of the BofA 
indices we use is lower than in the research of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) who used 
Moody’s indices and for Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) who used individual bonds. Still, an 
increase of 100 basis points in ∆riskfree implies a decrease of 10.2 basis points for OASIG and 
60.8 basis points for OASHY according to our model 1b. The consequence is that it makes the 
duration of a high yield bond smaller which is of importance for investors (Longstaff & 
Schwartz, 1995). High yield bonds also fluctuate more with price changes on risky assets which 
is in line with previous research. Should our proxy for asset returns move one standard 
deviation, OASIG respond with an inverse move of 1.2 basis points and OASHY with 18.5 basis 
points. 
Similar to the research of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Boss and Scheicher (2002), who 
extended their models much more exhaustively than in this paper, we too are unable to explain 
a majority of the variance in credit spreads. The mentioned authors were surprised by the high 
correlations between the residuals of their regressions as they thought their set of variables 
should adjust for the common factors. The correlation between the residuals of our different 
regressions for the 1999-2017 period are presented in table 6 below. The correlation is 
noticeably high and could perhaps be a result from omitting important variables from our 
models. This would in turn be a possible source of an endogeneity problem. One key factor 
which is not taking into account is the risk of the market. Variables account for risk aversion 
among investors of corporate debt, the liquidity risk and volatility of the bond and stock 
markets are examples of what we could have included to lower the risk of such issues. This 
could in turn also lower the correlation between the residuals of our different regression 
outputs. Nevertheless, the research of Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Boss and Scheicher 
(2002) both include a number of these variables and still find a high correlation between their 
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different residuals. Indeed, our findings show a higher correlation than in the research of 
Collin-Dufresne et al. and Boss and Scheicher which corresponds with what one could expect 
from our shorter model. Still, conclusions about this interdependence are to be made with 
cautiousness. Furthermore, it is likely that credit spreads on European corporate bonds to a 
large extent are driven by other factors than previous researchers have succeeded to prove and 
from what economic theory suggests. 
	
TABLE 6: CORRELATION BETWEEN RESIDUALS. 
Correlation coefficients between the residuals from the different regression with OAS. Vx corresponds 
to Model 1b and Wx to Model 2c. 
 VIG VHY WIG WHY 
VIG 1.000    
VHY 0.996 1.000   
WIG 0.979 0.975 1.000  
WHY 0.979 0.983 0.996 1.000 
 
The interpretation of these highly correlated residuals and the unexplained part is not 
straightforward. One argument has been made that bond markets are segmented from equity 
markets (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, & Martin, 2001). This would allow for the respective 
markets to be driven by separate, or local, shocks in supply or demand. However, the idea of 
segmented markets is farfetched as it implies equity and bond market will not react to the same 
macroeconomic factors.  
Nevertheless, like Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Boss and Scheicher (2002), we must 
conclude that there seems to be a significant systematic risk which our regression variable fails 
to capture.  
7. Conclusions 
7.1. Concluding discussion 
This thesis has investigated the relationship between changes in interest rates and credit spreads 
in the European bond market. Using two sets of bond indices, separating bonds of investment 
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grade rating from non-investment grade rated bonds, we use the two-factor model as 
constructed by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and regress changes in credit spreads on two 
independent variables; the ten-year risk-free rate and return on the stock market respectively. 
With inspiration from Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Boss and Scheicher (2002) we 
subsequently expand the two-factor model by adding a third variable which accounts for the 
slope of the euro area yield curve. We adjust for the potential callability effect by using OAS 
instead of regular nominal yield credit spreads and find results in line with previous research 
and our expectations for the two-factor model. That is to say, a negative relationship between 
the dependent variable credit spread and the independent variables risky asset returns and 
changes in the risk-free interest rate. 
Our dataset consists of weekly time series data collected over the period 1999-2017. It therefore 
encompasses both a period of rapid growth in the corporate bond market and a period in which 
the European Central Bank has set interest rates below zero. We break up the dataset into three 
sub-periods for a comparison of potential changes in the relationship between the variables.  
Over the entire period, the regression outputs of our two-factor model are largely in line with 
that of previous research. Furthermore, we find the interest rate-coefficient decreasing in 
magnitude for the high yield bond index but the models achieving higher explanatory power, 
as measured by R-squared, in the later period compared to the earlier. We conclude that this 
development can partly be attributed to the growth of the overall market since its creation, 
partly to the growing significance of stock return in the latter parts of our time series. For the 
expanded model we find a relationship for changes in credit spreads and the level of the yield 
curve and return on risky assets which are largely in parity to the findings of our peers. As for 
the slope however, we fail to find a significant variable that complies with previous research 
and economic sense.  
Lastly, we find high correlation in our residuals. This suggests that our model, like its 
predecessors, fails to capture a large systematic risk component. 
7.2. Excluded Variables and Suggestions for Future Research 
During the design of this study we have experimented with several other variables as well as 
variations when it comes to interest rates and spreads. That includes restructuring the models 
to quarterly data to include gross domestic product and real interest rates by incorporating 
inflation. In line with Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) and Boss and Scheicher (2002) we have 
also looked at government bond yield volatility and stock market volatility, among other 
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factors. Most of the experiments have turned out insignificant or difficult to interpret. The 
purpose of this thesis has never been to find a model explaining all of the variance in credit 
spreads rather than the effect from interest rates. Thus, we chose to stay with a simpler model 
in accordance with the foundation of research in this field. 
With regards to corporate bond indices, BofA Merrill Lynch provide a diverse index family. 
Despite this, sub-indices within non-investment grade bonds in the euro area are of rather 
limited quantity. Comparing bonds of different maturities, different types of issuing firms or 
breaking up the ratings in several trenches could have added to our research. However, this is 
a challenge for researchers due to lack of high yield indices and in some cases missing values 
within those who exist. 
As we have found a significant relationship between interest rates and credit spreads in the euro 
markets we suggest future research should focus on its implications. For example, how 
investors, corporate managers and policy maker could take advantage, or hedge against 
disadvantages, of this. Applying the models on baskets of individual bonds or awaiting the 
publication of new indices will allow for a more comprehensive comparison. Also, if and when 
interest rates return to a historical average the whole business cycle can be analysed and thus 
conclusions about its consequences on the corporate bond market can be drawn. 
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Appendix 
TABLE 7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SUB-SAMPLE 1, 1999-2006 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DOASIG 416 0.000% 0.030% -0.100% 0.130% 
DOASHY 416 -0.012% 0.387% -2.390% 2.070% 
DEURIBOR3M 416 0.001% 0.057% -0.470% 0.436% 
DEURIBOR12M 416 0.002% 0.072% -0.296% 0.308% 
DGECU2YR 416 0.002% 0.104% -0.365% 0.423% 
DGECU10YR 416 0.000% 0.092% -0.240% 0.306% 
RSXXE 416 0.088% 2.666% -11.151% 13.369% 
DSlope1 416 -0.001% 0.097% -0.274% 0.586% 
DSlope2 416 -0.002% 0.080% -0.286% 0.392% 
DSlope3 416 -0.002% 0.067% -0.234% 0.314% 
 
TABLE	8: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SUB-SAMPLE 2, 2007-2012	
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DOASIG 313 0.003% 0.086% -0.240% 0.610% 
DOASHY 313 0.009% 0.526% -3.490% 4.170% 
DEURIBOR3M 313 -0.011% 0.063% -0.336% 0.197% 
DEURIBOR12M 313 -0.011% 0.063% -0.287% 0.321% 
DGECU2YR 313 -0.013% 0.118% -0.421% 0.422% 
DGECU10YR 313 -0.008% 0.117% -0.356% 0.307% 
RSXXE 313 -0.071% 3.499% -21.760% 11.768% 
DSlope1 313 0.003% 0.127% -0.437% 0.561% 
DSlope2 313 0.003% 0.120% -0.323% 0.543% 
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DSlope3 313 0.004% 0.098% -0.322% 0.356% 
 
TABLE 9: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SUB-SAMPLE 3, 2013-2017	
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DOASIG 222 -0.001% 0.037% -0.120% 0.110% 
DOASHY 222 -0.006% 0.160% -0.520% 0.510% 
DEURIBOR3M 222 -0.002% 0.008% -0.059% 0.034% 
DEURIBOR12M 222 -0.003% 0.011% -0.060% 0.037% 
DGECU2YR 222 -0.003% 0.039% -0.136% 0.146% 
DGECU10YR 222 -0.004% 0.086% -0.165% 0.357% 
RSXXE 222 0.190% 2.276% -6.820% 5.59572% 
DSlope1 222 -0.002% 0.085% -0.168% 0.358% 
DSlope2 222 -0.001% 0.084% -0.167% 0.356% 
DSlope3 222 -0.001% 0.068% -0.150% 0.310% 
	
	
TABLE 10: CORRELATION BETWEEN OAS AND DIFFERENT INTEREST RATES, 1999-2017. 
Variable ΔOASIG ΔOASHY 
ΔEURIBOR3M 0.046 -0.072 
ΔEURIBOR6M 0.017 -0.125 
ΔEURIBOR12M -0.029 -0.167 
ΔGECU2YR -0.334 -0.339 
ΔGECU3YR -0.325 -0.341 
ΔGECU4YR -0.325 -0.330 
ΔGECU5YR -0.320 -0.316 
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TABLE 11: AUTOCORRELATION FOR ALL VARIABLES. 
Variable	 Corr (Variablet , Variablet-1) 
DCSIG 0.198 
DOASIG 0.335 
DCSIG 0.197 
DOASHY 0.227 
DEURIBOR3M 0.490 
DEURIBOR12M	 0.297 
DGECU2YR	 0.032 
DGECU10YR	 0.072 
RSXXE 0.009 
DSlope1	 0.041 
DSlope2	 0.067 
DSlope3	 0.064 
 
 
 
 
ΔGECU6YR -0.310 -0.318 
ΔGECU7YR -0.306 -0.315 
ΔGECU8YR -0.307 -0.305 
ΔGECU9YR -0.318 -0.311 
ΔGECU10YR -0.315 -0.311 
ΔGECU20YR -0.270 -0.259 
ΔGECU30YR -0.285 -0.269 
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TABLE 12: P-VALUES FROM F-TEST FOR SEASONALITY. 
The variables are regressed on quarterly dummies to test for seasonality. The null hypothesis is xr =yJ = yn = yK = 0 where y6 is the effect from Qn and the P-values are from testing joint significance 
with a F-test. We cannot reject the null hypothesis even at the 10% level with two exceptions being the 
Euribor3M and the Slope1 which is constructed with Euribor3M. They are however still not significant 
at the 5% level and hence, we should be unbiased from seasonality. 
Variable	 P-value 
DCSIG 0.128 
DOASIG 0.133 
DCSIG 0.188 
DOASHY 0.170 
DEURIBOR3M 0.067 
DEURIBOR12M	 0.112 
DGECU2YR	 0.218 
DGECU10YR	 0.135 
RSXXE 0.288 
DSlope1	 0.075 
DSlope2	 0.174 
DSlope3	 0.5746 
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